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and Satisfaction with Achieving Objectives in the UK Third Sector 
 
Abstract 
  
As a major funder of the Third Sector, recent cuts in UK Government spending may 
require Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) to turn to other sources of funding, such 
as trading activities and public sector contracts. It has been argued that such 
changes can lead to economic objectives overwhelming social ones. This study 
utilises data from the 2008 National Survey of Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO) 
to examine the relationship between the use of these alternative funding sources and 
organisations’ perceived success in achieving their primary objectives. As predicted 
by theory, a negative relationship between income from trading activities and 
achievement of objectives is found. Interestingly public sector contracts do not show 
a significant link with achievement of objectives. Social enterprise should therefore 
not be seen as an unqualified panacea for difficulties in social welfare provision in 
the UK, but public sector contracts need not necessarily lead to a loss of those 
elements that make the Third Sector provision attractive. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Third Sector and social enterprise have been seen as increasingly attractive for 
a number of years for governments looking to reduce the burden of the welfare state 
(Austin et al., 2006; Amin, 2009). The Third Sector’s embedded nature within those 
communities that they serve has also been suggested to make it an appropriate and 
efficient delivery mechanism for public sector provision (HM Treasury, 2007). This 
has led to the public sector being the single largest funder of the Third Sector, 
contributing £13.9 billion of a total income of £36.7 billion in 2009/10 (Clifford et al., 
2010; Clarke et al., 2012). However, cuts in UK Government spending have 
threatened the provision of many social welfare programmes within both the public 
and third sectors (Diochon and Anderson, 2009). In addition, a desire for greater 
accountability has seen a move from grant funding to that based on contracts (Kerlin, 
2006; Wei-Skillern and Marciano, 2008). One potential solution to this probable short 
fall in funding is that the Third Sector should derive more of its income from trading 
activities (Dart, 2004). 
Although social entrepreneurship appears an attractive option there has been 
criticism that those organisations that embrace such an approach can struggle to 
handle the need to generate income whilst at the same time fulfilling their social 
objectives. Considerable skill is required to handle the double bottom line that this 
creates (Oster et al., 2004; Tracy and Phillips, 2007). In order to utilise these sources 
of finance it seems that Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) may have to lose or 
compromise some of their key attributes and values (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). 
There is also a danger that the economic imperative can lead to organisations 
concentrating on certain activities that have income generating potential and forgoing 
those that may have a greater social benefit (Bull and Crompton, 2006; Kong, 2010). 
In other words there is a danger that TSOs may suffer from mission drift (McBrearty, 
2007). To examine whether such dangers exist from the greater use of public sector 
contracts and social enterprise techniques within the Third Sector, this study 
examines whether there is a negative relationship with the achievement of primary 
social objectives. In order to investigate these questions the study utilises data from 
the 2008 UK National Survey of Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO). This large 
data of UK TSOs is used to examine whether there are any link between the source 
of income adopted and the organisations’ satisfaction at meeting their objectives in 
the past and also their confidence in meeting them in the future. A multiple 
regression approach is adopted to control for other factors that may increase or 
decrease the likelihood that objectives will be met. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the literature relating to the funding of the Third Sector and the links 
between social entrepreneurship and social welfare provision. The NSTSO data and 
methods utilised in this study are introduced in section 3. The results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5 summarises the findings of the study and provides 
conclusions in relation to the implications for future policy development with regard to 
the Third Sector’s funding arrangements and role in social welfare provision. 
 
2. Funding the Third Sector 
 
The Third Sector is seen as having an important role in providing a variety of 
different goods and services ranging from those associated with social capital 
development to advocacy roles and capacity building (Putnam, 1993; Bolton, 2003; 
Pearce, 2003; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011). Its greater engagement with communities 
allows a better understanding of needs and aids access to difficult to reach groups 
within society. This gives it a significant advantage over the public and private 
sectors in delivering these goods and services where they are most needed 
(Wainwright, 2002). Understandably, this has seen the Third Sector in the UK and 
other countries as being viewed and promoted as an attractive method of delivering 
social services efficiently and effectively (Giddens, 1998; Pearce, 2003; Proulx et al., 
2007). One development has been the embracement of social entrepreneurship 
when viewed in its wider form as the use of trading activities to provide funding and 
in some cases deliver the goods themselves (Thompson et al., 2011). This has the 
potential to further reduce the strain on public sector finances at a time when 
government deficits need to be cut, and potentially provides a more sustainable 
source of funding (Dart, 2004). What constitutes enterprise in TSOs, however, is 
disputed by organisations themselves, with the term often used to refer to quite 
different activities (Seanor et al., 2011).  
Although income from trading activities and fees for services provided have 
become more common, this is not the complete story (Wilding et al., 2006; Reichart 
et al., 2008; Teasdale, 2010). Both in the UK and internationally, the Third Sector is 
heavily reliant on the public sector for funding (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). One of 
the criticisms levelled at existing social enterprises is their over reliance on grants, 
without which they would not survive (Chell et al., 2005; Chell, 2007). However, with 
demands for greater accountability and sustainability there has been a shift from 
public funding in the form of grants to that of contracts (Kerlin, 2006; Wei-Skillern 
and Marciano, 2008). 
These changes might have undesirable consequences if they interfere with 
the extent to which organisations can focus purely on achieving their social 
objectives (Weisbrod, 1998a), particularly where organisations attempt to adapt to 
changes during a transition phase (Seanor et al., 2011). For many social enterprises 
it is difficult to balance the achievement of the organisation’s primary social 
objectives with the commercial aims of the entrepreneurial venture, which supports 
these objectives (Adamson, 2003; Pearce, 2003; Pharoah et al., 2004; Nicholls, 
2006). The extent to which there is tension between these two sets of objectives 
varies (Dart, 2004; Westall, 2009b; Bielefeld, 2009), and some organisations are 
more successful in developing strategies to overcome this phenomena (Jäger and 
Beyes, 2010). However, their drive for economic efficiency, could prove destructive 
in terms of making profits at the expense of meeting community needs (Goerke, 
2003). The degree of alignment between social and economic objectives is in part 
determined by the choice of goods supplied by the TSO. Weisbrod (1998b) splits 
goods into: preferred collective goods, for which no user fee can be charged; 
preferred private goods; and nonpreferred private goods. User fees can be charged 
for both nonpreferred and preferred private goods. There is some degree of 
alignment between social and economic objectives with preferred private goods, and 
its provision is a key method of achieving their social objectives (Alter, 2006). This 
would, for example, include those organisation's that attempt to provide a bridge to 
the world of work through placements for the long-term unemployed. Economic 
success may be sacrificed to gain the added value of developing employment skills 
of those marginalised from the world of work, but there is also a lot of cross over. 
However, there is no such alignment for nonpreferred private goods. These are sold 
purely to subsidise the provision of preferred collective or preferred private goods, 
although connections may still exist to the extent that common inputs are used to 
achieve both missions (Weisbrod, 1998a). In general TSOs are unlikely to undertake 
profit maximising activities in their commercial activities as distributional objectives 
will provide a disutility from activities entirely associated with profit maximisation 
(Weisbrod, 1998a; Steinberg and Weisbrod, 1998). A further difficulty in applying the 
social entrepreneurship model to more deprived areas is that customers can often be 
indirect. Others such as the local authority may pay for these outputs (McBrearty, 
2007), which means such activities are more akin to public service provision rather 
than social entrepreneurship. 
The need to commit to the organisation’s commercial goals can put their core 
values under strain (Wei-Skillern and Marciano, 2008; Seanor et al., 2011). In part 
this relates to what Billis (2010b) describes as the hybridisation of the organisation. 
This reflects the tendency for organisations to exhibit the characteristics of more than 
one sector rather than those of a pure third, private or public sector organisation. It is 
argued that the political climate has been partly responsible for many TSOs having 
to adopt the characteristics of either the private or public sectors (Billis, 2010a; 
Harris, 2010). In fact McBrearty (2007) found that changing the organisational culture 
was a critical success factor in moving to a social enterprise model. Some of the 
Third Sector’s recent success in attracting extra government resources comes from 
the perception that it has characteristics which make it an attractive mechanism for 
transforming the delivery of public services (Home Office, 1998; Cabinet Office 
Strategy Unit, 2002; HM Treasury, 2007), but some have argued that this is a double 
edged sword (Jones, 2010). Although the characteristics of the Third Sector are 
attractive to governments, in order to take advantage of these extra resources it 
seems impossible to retain the original pure Third Sector culture and some degree of 
hybridisation must occur. This is an international concern with studies in Québec 
(Proulx et al., 2007) and Sweden (Chartrand, 2004), for example, noting fears about 
instrumentation of the Third Sector and loss of autonomy due to government 
intervention. A broadening of activities in recent years might be seen as what Billis 
(2010b) describes as shallow hybridisation, where the basic Third Sector identity 
remains in place. The change associated with accessing new finance sources it 
seems leads instead to entrenched hybridisation where the core identity of the Third 
Sector begins to change. In other words, although the Third Sector has gained 
resources and influence, in doing so it can be argued that it has had to compromise 
on some of its core values (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). Haugh and Kitson (2007) 
suggest there is a danger that TSOs could be used to marketise the welfare state by 
the government, and where economically successful get drawn into becoming fully 
privatised. Others, such as Evers (2005) and Harris (2010), note the pressure for 
TSOs to hybridise as governments reconceptualise what constitutes public services.  
This means that TSOs are exposed to isomorphic pressures and increased 
interaction from the markets (Reid and Griffith, 2006; Leiter, 2008; Mason, 2012). In 
a Swedish context, Åberg (forthcoming) also highlights the need for particular 
organisational structures to be adopted in order to gain state funding. However, it 
can be argued that there is no reason for TSOs to enter a Faustian pact when 
accessing new sources of finance, and these greater resources may even allow 
more of those that traditionally benefited from Third Sector goods and services to 
benefit (Billis, 2010a). Alternatively the Third Sector can be seen as occupying an 
intermediate space between the state, community and market economies (Evers and 
Laville, 2004; Westall, 2009b). In this manner hybridisation once completed is not 
likely to diminish the organisation’s role as they are adapting to fulfil the changing 
needs of this intermediary role. Seanor et al. (2011) find organisation's actually 
develop multiple identities for dealing with differing stakeholders, so the new 
relationships and sources of finance do not necessarily result in hybridisation of the 
organisation. However, it is unclear whether language relating to retention of 
historical ideals is rhetoric, used purely to provide legitimacy with certain 
stakeholders, whilst actual activities are altered (Åberg, forthcoming). 
In practical terms a social entrepreneurship model can only be adopted where 
the TSO’s output is in the form of a tradable product or service (McBrearty, 2007), or 
can redesigned as such. As noted above in the case of Weisbrod’s (1998b) preferred 
collective goods this is unlikely to be possible, as their provision through the Third 
Sector may often reflect a market failure in the first place (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). 
The temptation to concentrate on providing those goods and services which will 
maximise revenue raising opportunities is clearly evident (Dees, 1998; Eikenberry 
and Kluver, 2003; Weisbrod, 2004). Alexander et al. (1999) finds that resources are 
diverted away from activities such as advocacy and those associated with creating 
social capital. The difficulty here is that services that benefit a community as a whole 
will have more of a public good nature, where all members of the community will 
benefit regardless of whether they contribute to their provision. Intended or not, the 
move to a more commercial approach is found to alter the culture of the 
organisation, so some degree of hybridisation becomes inevitable. McBrearty (2007) 
for example, found that TSOs acknowledged that they have a growing awareness 
that everything has a cost. Resources may actually be absorbed by activities outside 
the organisations’ core competencies, as the Third Sector is not well placed to 
compete with the private sector given its higher costs associated with operating in a 
socially responsible manner and lack of previous experience in such activities 
(McBrearty, 2007). 
Whilst it may appear that grants and contracts with government may be 
preferable to earned income from trading activities, some TSOs feel that they are 
diverted from community development work towards the provision of public services 
(Cairns et al., 2006). Effectively they are forced to hybridise by taking on traits of the 
public sector, such as, thinking about national needs as well as those of their 
traditional local stakeholders (Billis, 2010b; Harris, 2010). This can include pressure 
to increase scale to achieve efficiency gains (Cairns et al., 2007). At the same time 
the greater application of market approaches within public sector provision has seen 
TSOs having to act in a more competitive manner in order to compete for public 
sector funding (Harris, 2010). Again, this is likely to distract from core principles and 
potentially sees these organisations operating more like private businesses 
attempting to respond to their customers’ needs in an efficient manner (Wei-Skillern 
and Marciano, 2008). Harrow and Palmer (2003) suggest that this more business 
orientated approach may see these organisations reconsider all aspects of their 
activities, so that services previously freely provided may only become available at a 
price for those organisations adopting such an approach. However, depending on 
the nature of the Third Sector and government interface there may be potential of co-
construction of the objectives and activities undertaken (Proulx et al., 2007). 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the emphasis on accountability 
and transparency within the Third Sector as a whole with funders requiring more 
comprehensive evaluations of activities (Ellis and Gregory, 2008; Arvidson, 2009). 
TSOs may lack the resources and skills to undertake such activities (Ellis and 
Gregory, 2008). There are rarely additional resources allocated by funding providers 
for the purposes of conducting these evaluations (Carman and Fredericks, 2008). 
Understandably, the redirection of core funding to such activities is unpopular and 
seen as a resource drain and distraction (Wainwright, 2002; Carman and Fredericks, 
2008). However, it is often hard to measure the true impact of a TSO's activities. 
Monitoring tends to prioritise measurement of outputs as a best available measure of 
impact, rather than processes (Kendall and Knapp, 2000; Shaw and Allen, 2006). 
Here values such as morality and ethics are secondary to outputs, such as 
alleviating deprivation, which can be more easily given an economic value (Westall, 
2009a). Such measures can lead to a change in the activities of the organisation 
(Wainwright, 2002). For example, those participants that are easiest to serve and 
least marginalised from the workplace might be served first rather than those in 
greatest need (Jaffe, 2001; Theuvsen, 2004). There is a danger that some activities 
will be abandoned completely where outcomes are harder to measure and in the 
case of advocacy could even be seen as biting the hand that feeds them (Lyon, 
2009; Osborne and Super, 2010). Shaw and Allen (2006), however, use the example 
of provincial Funding Trust in New Zealand to show this need not be the case. Here 
a more qualitative approach to control, with an emphasis on understanding the 
diversity of the Third Sector, informal communication and a better trust-control 
balance was adopted. Ultimately whilst there is likely to be some alignment of the 
public sector’s and the TSOs’ broader aims, there are also likely to be subtle, but 
important, differences in the detail, so that only partial alignment is present.  
The need to evaluate activities to obtain access to funding may often see the 
organisations accept greater hybridisation through employment of more full time staff 
and adoption of more professional managerial approaches. Overly managerial 
approaches within the Third Sector can alienate volunteers, as the organisation of 
volunteers may improve, it can also make many feel it is too much like a job (Gaskin, 
2003; Leonard et al., 2004; Milligan and Fyfe, 2005; Low et al., 2007; Ellis Paine et 
al., 2010). Although, TSOs may feel that public sector funds are the only source of 
resources available to meet growing needs of society, this potential conflict with 
volunteers must not be ignored as the free labour they provide is effectively an 
alternative type of donation (Weisbrod, 1998a), which has similar if not greater value 
than other resources. Using data from 40 countries, Sokolowski (forthcoming) 
highlights the interdependence of funding sources. Although at the aggregate level a 
positive relationship is found between government funding and individual donations, 
there are also patterns consistent with government funding of organisations 
providing public services resulting in philanthropic flight to those TSOs providing 
expressive goods such as advocacy. The need for greater accountability from public 
sector funders could place constraints on an organisation’s activities. This means 
that earned income through trading activities might actually be seen as a source of 
unconditional funding, which allows the organisation to pursue its primary objectives 
in an unrestricted fashion (Cairns et al., 2006; Kelly, 2007).  
Table I below summarises the main characteristics of the two sources of Third 
Sector funding under discussion and the main literature sources highlighting these 
factors. Figure 1 outlines the theoretical linkages between the choice of finance, the 
availability of resources, their use, and the outcomes achieved. It is not reasonable 
to simply attempt to sum the number of more positive aspects of each source against 
its negatives as the importance of the characteristics may not all be equal. It is clear 
that income from trading activities tends to have a number of positives in terms of the 
associated autonomy and potential for long term sustainability, if executed correctly. 
However, it tends to score poorly with regard to its average alignment to objectives 
and pre-existing availability of the skills required to make use of the income source, 
which in the face of tough competition from the private sector may make it a highly 
unreliable source of funding until competencies are established. Public sector 
contracts on the other hand are more restrictive on the Third Sector’s activities, but 
this is offset with a greater alignment of the objectives.  
 
Please Insert Table I About Here 
 
Overall this perhaps suggests that both income sources could jeopardise complete 
achievement of objectives through some degree of hybridisation. The greater 
alignment of public sector objectives may ensure that primary social objectives are 
more likely to be at least partly met, although there is a danger that the probability of 
meeting them fully is also reduced, so the probability of both complete success and 
failure are reduced. The existing studies of social entrepreneurship, however, 
suggest that income from trading activities could potentially have positive effects, but 
could also increase the risk of complete failure if enacted poorly. Section 3 below 
introduces the data from the National Survey of Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO) 
and the methods used to investigate the relationship between income from these two 
sources and the extent that objectives of the Third Sector are felt to be met. 
 
Please Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
The data utilised in this study is drawn from the National Survey of Third Sector 
Organisations (NSTSO), which was first conducted in 2008 (Cabinet Office et al. 
2008). The data was originally collected by Ipsos MORI, Social Research Institute, 
and GuideStar UK, and funded by the Cabinet Office, Office of the Third Sector. The 
NSTSO was intended to provide a measurement tool for the Local Government 
Performance Framework, in particular capturing the extent that local government 
achieves the objective of providing an environment for a thriving Third Sector. As 
such it looked to capture the various issues that determine the Third Sector’s local 
and general success including: funding relationships; local help, support and advice; 
availability of resources; and local partnerships and involvement in local decisions 
(Ipsos MORI and Social Research Institute, 2009). Reflecting the need to capture the 
environment created for all TSOs and the services they provide, particularly those 
relating to government objectives of alleviating disadvantage etc., the survey takes a 
relatively broad definition of the Third Sector (Westall, 2009b). A majority of those 
organisations included had the legal form of charities. As well as charities the survey 
also included Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG), Industrial and Provident 
Societies and Community Interest Companies (CIC). Appendix 1 provides further 
detail on these other legal forms and their implications for operations and distribution 
of any surplus created. This provided a sampling frame of approximately 129,000 
charities and 40,000 other organisations based in England. The sampling frame and 
definition of types of TSO was obtained from Guidestar UK, based on data available 
from Charities Commission and data directly supplied by TSOs. We retain 
observations for all four legal forms in the analysis as the choice of legal form may 
have in part been influenced by changes in funding methods utilised. As discussed 
below dummies are used to control for these differing legal forms in the analysis. The 
survey data provided just over 24,000 observations with all required information. 
The NSTSO captures data on a wide range of TSOs’ characteristics including: 
the beneficiaries of their services, the role they fulfil in the community, their 
employment, turnover, and legal form. However, there is also considerable detail 
included in relation to the sources of finance that the organisations' have sought and 
utilised. Given the differing uses and disputed uses of the terms social enterprise 
and social entrepreneurs (Seanor et al., 2011), we restrict our analysis to the 
influence of difference finance sources upon achievement of the main objectives of 
the organisation. Respondents are requested to record their use of the following 
finance sources: 
 
• Donations and fundraising activities 
• Membership fees/subscriptions 
• Grants from non-statutory bodies 
• National Lottery 
• Grants or core funding (including service level agreements) 
• Earned income from contracts 
• Earned income from trading including retail 
• Income from investments 
 
For the purposes of this work the sources of finance that will be of the greatest 
interest will be those corresponding to, earned income from contracts, and earned 
income from trading. It is unfortunate that earned income from contracts is not split 
by source of these contracts, although evidence from previous studies finds that a 
majority of such contracts will be with the public sector (Harris, 2010). Two measures 
of funding sources accessed were included in the data. In the first respondents were 
required to identify any funding sources that had been used regardless of their 
importance as a source of finance. The second measure required that only the most 
important source of funding for the organisation was selected. This allows the impact 
on achievement of objectives to be examined for the different levels of overall 
reliance.  
For the first measure, the inclusion of dummy variables to reflect the use of a 
funding source within a multiple regression analysis, is relatively uncomplicated, as 
the use of one funding source does not influence the use, or lack of use, of any other 
funding source. Therefore each dummy can be viewed as an independent 
comparator of use of the funding source against lack of use. This approach cannot 
be used where the dummies representing the main source of funding are used. This 
is because where one of the dummies takes a value of 1 for an organisation all of the 
other dummy variables must take a value of 0 for that same organisation. This 
means at least one option has to be excluded to avoid multicollinearity. Two 
alternative approaches are used to consider the impact of income through trading 
activities and income from contracts as the most important source of funding. The 
first approach is to consider each as the most important source of finance 
individually. The dummy reflects differences in the level of satisfaction in achieving 
objectives when using one source of finance as the main source compared to all 
others. For example, does using income from trading activities increase or decrease 
the satisfaction with achieving objectives compared to all other alternatives. The 
second approach is to include dummies to represent all but one main source of 
income. They are compared to one excluded option. The difficulty here is choosing 
which funding source to use as the excluded base category. Choosing a funding 
source, which is associated with not achieving objectives will increase the positive 
results for other variables and vice versa. Here we choose to compare other sources 
of finance to donations and fundraising activities to see if relatively satisfaction from 
relying on other sources is significantly higher or lower than this traditional approach. 
The NSTSO provides two items that could potentially act as dependent 
variables in the study. One option is to analyse the extent to which organisations 
claim they have been successful in achieving their main objectives over the last 
twelve months. This backward looking measure is recorded on a four point scale 
consisting of: not at all successful, not very successful, fairly successful, and very 
successful. An alternative is to consider the confidence that the organisations 
indicate of being able to meet their objectives over the next twelve months. This 
again is recorded on a four point scale of: not at all confident, not very confident, 
fairly confident, and very confident. Both measures are used, as the choice of 
funding utilised in a period may directly influence the achievement of objectives, but 
it might be the extent to which the organisation accepts it has to choose which 
activities to undertake in the future that is where the limitations of the social 
organisation might be most strongly felt (McBrearty, 2007). The forward looking 
measure also helps to identify, which direction the relationship is likely to flow. 
However, as it is based on predictions of outcomes, which are yet to occur, the 
backward looking measure may be more accurate.  
A problem with these measures is that organisations are not told what they 
should regard as their main objectives and how success in achieving them should be 
measured. Ideally objectives would be regarded in terms of the impact the 
organisation has on the well-being of the communities they serve (Wainwright, 
2002). However, the difficulties in measuring impact may mean many consider 
output based measures (Carman and Fredericks, 2008). Some may even consider 
process based measures (Sowa et al., 2004). Where the output or process based 
measures are used to determine the level of success, sources of finance directly 
linked to these activities rather than raising auxiliary income, will tend to increase 
satisfaction to a greater extent, although the organisation’s impact may not be any 
greater. This may mean that contracts are viewed more positively than trading 
income. This is more likely to be an issue when using the finance measure based on 
the main income source. 
Given that both current success in meeting objectives and confidence in 
meeting future objectives were skewed towards the positive end of the spectrum 
both variables were recoded into three categories, with the less commonly selected 
negative responses recoded together. In the case of current success the variable 
became: not successful, fairly successful, and very successful. The confidence in 
achieving objectives over the next twelve months became: not confident, fairly 
confident and very confident. The ordinal rather than continuous nature of the 
dependent variables mean that an ordinary least squares regression approach is not 
appropriate. Initially ordered logit regressions were utilised. Link tests examining the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the estimated predicted values 
(Tukey, 1949; Pregibon, 1980), suggested that the dependent variable was 
misspecified. One explanation is that some independent variables may influence the 
probability of an organisation feeling it has not been successful in achieving its 
objectives relative to being fairly successful, but not influence the probability of 
perceiving itself to have been very successful rather than fairly successful. In other 
words the independent variables may have had non-symmetrical effects on the 
relative levels of success. To accommodate this possibility the specification adopted 
in this study is that of a multinominal logit regression. 
As well as the source of funding variables the other independent variables 
included were intended to capture factors which may influence the degree to which a 
TSO may achieve its objectives. Starting with the organisations’ characteristics, 
controls were included for: the legal form of the organisation, charity, community 
interest company, company limited by guarantee, industrial and provincial society; 
the organisations’ scale measured separately by employees and volunteers; scale of 
operations, local, regional, national and international; main groups being served, the 
general public, victims of crime or drug abuse, those suffering from mental or 
physical disability, members of minority groups in society. Scale is likely to mean an 
organisation possesses or is able to gain access to resources, which can be used to 
achieve its objectives. However, the objectives of a large organisation may become 
more blurred, whereas a smaller organisation can focus clearly on a very particular 
outcome it wishes to achieve. The number of employees and volunteers were not 
strongly correlated, so both could be included as alternative measures of scale. 
Income, however, did appear to correlate with employment, as indicated by the 
variance inflation factors. Employment was preferred to income as this data was 
missing for fewer organisations.  
The nature of the main groups using the organisations’ services may influence 
the extent that they are able to achieve their objectives, particularly if serving harder 
to reach groups of the population. In order to establish the main groups serviced by 
each organisation, Principal Component Analysis was utilised (for details please see 
Appendix 2). The area in which the organisation was located was also controlled for 
to capture any difficulties that physical and psychic distances from the local 
population being served might cause. To control for physical difficulties in providing a 
service, the density of population, as measured by population per hectare, was 
allowed to enter the regressions. Psychic distance might be greater when trying to 
provide services to more deprived communities, as such communities often struggle 
from being isolated from the wider community, which can lead to a lack of trust for 
those attempting to provide services (HM Treasury, 2002). The level of support that 
an organisation might receive was captured indirectly using data from the Place 
Survey of England 2008 (Communities and Local Government, 2009). This data was 
collected in late 2008 by each local authority in England in the form of a postal 
survey to gather opinion relating to the quality-of-life in the local authority area, and 
citizens’ perspectives of the area within a 15-20 minute walk of home. We use an 
item relating to the representative proportion of the local authority population that 
had provided free support for an organisation in their area in the last 12 months 
(Communities and Local Government, 2010). A more direct measure of support for 
and power of the organisation was taken from NSTSO relating to organisations’ 
satisfaction with their perceived influence on local decisions relevant to the 
organisation. Although this was one of the variables with the largest number of non-
responses given the potential importance that local political leverage might have on 
achieving objectives the variable was retained. As with the variables relating to the 
organisation itself no evidence of problems with collinearity were suggested by the 
variance inflation factors. An overall average of 1.3 or less was found for the 
regressions for both the previous 12 month period and the next 12 month period. To 
establish whether choice of finance source has any relationship with success in 
achieving objectives, specifications are run using firm and area characteristics 
without the finance variables, and then with the finance variables included. This 
enables the determination of whether these additional variables add to the 
understanding of the outcomes achieved. This nested model approach is similar to 
that used by Sokolowski (forthcoming) in order to identify the impact of government 
funding on private donations at the national level. 
 
4. Results 
 
Before considering the regression analysis that controls for the other characteristics 
of the TSOs, the simple patterns of success in achieving objectives and how these 
relate to the sources of finance utilised are presented (Table II). For all but two 
sources, membership fees and income from trading activities, use of a finance 
source is positively associated with being very successful in achieving the 
organisation’s objectives (Table II Panel A). The results are consistent with most 
sources of finance contributing to the resources available to achieve the 
organisations’ objectives. It is notable that earned income from trading is one of the 
exceptions. This is the pattern that might be expected if skills shortages drew 
resources away from core activities (McBrearty, 2007), into activities that are not 
strongly aligned with the organisation’s social objectives (Weisbrod, 1998b), as is 
shown in the right hand side of Figure 1. Where reliance on trading activities is 
greater and it becomes the main source of income the proportion of organisations 
that are very successful in achieving their objectives falls further, and the proportion 
of organisations, which are not successful rises. Income from contracts on the other 
hand appears to have a positive relationship with success in achieving objectives. In 
terms of the model presented in section 2 this is consistent with the short term 
reliability of these funding sources (Jones, 2010), and closer alignment with 
organisation’s objectives (Billis, 2010b), meaning that the additional resources 
available to the organisation, compensate for the additional regulatory burden 
imposed (Arvidson, 2009).  
 
Please Insert Table II About Here 
 
 
To identify whether the choice of finance has an influence over and above 
differences in organisational and area characteristics the regression analysis 
outlined in section 3 is utilised. The R2 values suggest that relatively little deviation is 
explained, which is understandable given the diverse nature and activities of the 
Third Sector (Kendall and Knapp, 1995). However, the likelihood ratio tests indicate 
that the regressions outperform the null of a constant probability at the 0.1 percent 
level.  
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of the finance variables finds the null 
hypothesis of their joint insignificance can be rejected at the 1 percent level. Thus, 
after controlling for other characteristics, the choice of finance is found to have an 
additional influence the probabilities of TSOs achieving their objectives. Individually 
those sources of funding with greater autonomy over their use, such as grant 
funding, lottery funding, and income from investments, are found to increase the 
likelihood of having felt the organisation was very successful in meeting its 
objectives. For funding from contracts, there is weak evidence that the probability of 
being unsuccessful is reduced, but no increase in the probability of being very 
successful. In terms of the model presented in section 2 this is consistent with the 
benefits of access to a reliable relatively sustainable source of resources to fund 
optimal objectives being offset by the drain on resources by the high regulatory 
burden and skills shortages in competing for these resources. The weak evidence of 
no success being less likely to occur, is compatible with the model’s suggestion that 
moderate alignment of public and Third Sector objectives will have a positive 
influence on overall achievement of the organisation’s objectives where contract 
funding is used. In comparison, earned income from trading reduces the probability 
of being very successful compared to the probability of being fairly successful in 
achieving objectives. As noted above explanations for this relate to a lack of skills 
and weak alignment of activities with core objectives. In the model the drain on 
resources to undertake activities outside the organisation’s core competencies more 
than eliminates any benefit from the surplus created.  
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Other characteristics negatively related to the probabilities of successfully achieving 
organisational objectives include: serving harder to reach groups of the population; 
those legal forms linked to more business like activities; and smaller scale. Analysis 
undertaken using the sub-samples of charities, Companies Limited by Guarantee, 
and Industrial and Provincial Societies (the Community Interest Group was too small 
to produce meaningful results), produced similar results in terms of the estimated 
relative risk values, although the relationships are frequently insignificant due to the 
reduced sample sizes.  
 The choice of finance variable was found to have little impact on the relative 
risk values associated with the characteristics of the local area or TSO. Given this, 
for preservation of space, only the finance variables are reported in the tables of 
results below. As before, earned income from contracts produces relative risk values 
associated with an increased probability of very successful achievement of 
objectives, and decreased probability of no success relative to being fairly 
successful, but these are not significant (Table IV). As discussed in section 2 this 
would be expected where hybridisation has seen the organisation become a pseudo 
public sector service provider and therefore the contract will be designed to align 
objectives of the public sector funder and the TSO. At this point the results are 
consistent with the activities associated with contracts having a substantial 
contribution to the organisation’s objectives as shown in the connection between 
public sector contracts and social objectives at the bottom left of Figure 1. However, 
as this hybridisation becomes more entrenched, this relationship may not be without 
conflict and resentment (Ellis Paine et al., 2010), whereby objectives are felt to be to 
some extent compromised (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). In section 3 it was noted that 
any interpretation of the organisation’s objectives being perceived by respondents as 
referring to processes rather than outcomes may positively influence the relative risk 
ratio for income from contracts, particularly for the main income source measure. 
The similarity of results for income earned from contracts presented in Tables III and 
IV suggest that any bias of this type is relatively minor.  
The TSOs using earned income from trading activities as their main finance 
source are both significantly more likely to feel they have not been successful in 
meeting their objectives, and less likely to feel they have been very successful in 
meeting their objectives. TSOs are 20 percent more likely to not successfully achieve 
their objectives rather than be fairly successful if they use earned income from 
trading as their main source of finance. As discussed in section 2 it is possible that 
trading activities can be developed in some cases to help to achieve the social 
objective of the organisation. Even where there is a weak alignment of trading 
activities with social objectives, this does not necessary limit success if the surplus 
created by auxiliary activities feeds back into resources is greater than the resources 
required to generate it, as shown in the top right of Figure 1. The decreased 
likelihood of being successful found here, suggests that neither route to achieving 
social objectives is present for most TSOs taking this more commercially orientated 
route. 
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When considering the impact of finance choice on confidence of achieving future 
objectives, interestingly grant finance is found to decrease the likelihood that 
organisations will be confident that they can achieve their objectives (Table V Model 
5). This may partly reflect the uncertainty associated with grant funding as an on-
going source of finance (Senyard et al., 2007). There is weak evidence of a similar 
reduction in the probability of being confident of achieving objectives when using 
earned income from contracts, but this is only significant at the 10 per cent level, 
perhaps reflecting the longer-term nature of contracts (indicated as a medium 
strength flow back into resources from contract activities in Figure 1). Earned income 
from trading activities increases the probability of not being confident of achieving 
objectives and the confidence of successfully achieving objectives is reduced. The 
results cannot establish if this relationship is driven by a weaker alignment of 
activities with objectives or a drain on resources, but there is no evidence that 
greater autonomy over how this finance is used increases confidence in being able 
to achieve objectives. Understandably the source of funding most strongly 
associated with achievement of objectives in the future is income from investments 
where greater stability of flows is likely to be present, but in addition organisations 
also enjoy greater independence in how they utilise this source of funding. The 
results are similar when the main sources of finance variables are used (Table V 
Models 6 to 8). 
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Although not reported here, most relationships between confidence in successfully 
achieving objectives in the future and organisation or area characteristics remain the 
same as those for actual achievement of success in the past. Exceptions include, 
local volunteer engagement levels are found to reduce the probability of expecting to 
not achieving objectives in the future. Greater population density also increases the 
confidence of achieving objectives in the future, perhaps suggesting a greater 
density of potential clients may make achieving objectives seem easier. Unlike actual 
achievement of objectives scale does not seem to play a role, perhaps reflecting a 
lack of appreciation of the role that resource availability plays in achieving objectives. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Using theory relating to the hybridisation of TSOs with the private and public sectors, 
this paper examined the potential for these sources of finance to provide a 
sustainable funding source that still enables the Third Sector to retain its unique 
characteristics and qualities. The theory developed in the first part of the paper 
suggested that both public sector contract funding and income from trading activities 
were imperfect sources of funding in this regard. Although public sector contracts 
potentially would lead to greater entrenchment of hybridisation turning TSOs into 
public service providers, income from trading activities could also lead to entrenched 
hybridisation (Billis, 2010b; Harris, 2010), but perhaps more importantly would 
require the Third Sector to adopt activities outside of their core competencies 
(McBrearty, 2007; Ellis and Gregory, 2008). Thus, the pressure to achieve the 
economic objective would distract and draw resources from achievement of the core 
social objective (Weisbrod, 1998a). Although previous studies have theorised about 
the potential impact of accessing funding from contracts and earned income on 
achievement of objectives or even the overall mission of TSOs, less empirical work 
has examined the evidence for these changes taking place. This study contributes to 
the discussion of the overall impact of changes in Third Sector funding and the 
associated hybridisation using data from the National Survey of the Third Sector 
Organisations. 
The empirical analysis found that no significant relationship was present 
between income from contracts and success in achieving core objectives. Given the 
counteracting forces outlined in the theory developed, it is likely that income from 
contracts will not be neutral, but rather will have positive and negative influences on 
the probability of successfully achieving objectives both previously and in the future. 
The problem is that there is only partial alignment between the third and public 
sectors’ objectives (Harris, 2010). Combined with the burden of greater monitoring 
(Low et al., 2007; Carman and Fredericks, 2008; Arvidson, 2009), this study finds 
that the this steadier and more secure source of funding actually displays no overall 
benefit for the TSO. However, the study finds no evidence that as far as the 
organisations are concerned, accessing this finance has had a negative overall 
effect on their ability to achieve their objectives as certain goods and resources are 
no longer provided (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). The results therefore suggest that 
TSOs are not disadvantaged overall by a shift from traditional sources of funding to 
contracts, as any negative consequences appear to be balanced by the additional 
resources made available. Considering the Third Sector as a whole rather than 
individual organisations, some goods and services are much less likely to be 
provided through government contracts than through more traditional sources of 
finance. Contracts could be adjusted to ensure that these goods and services are not 
neglected. However, where the provision of these goods or services have 
traditionally been through the Third Sector rather than the public sector, such as 
advocacy, it is far from guaranteed that governments will create contracts to include 
their provision. This means that policy makers have to consider the value of those 
goods and services that are likely to be marginalised and the impact that their 
absence will have upon those communities that have traditionally gained from their 
provision. Although not forced to seek these sources of funding the government 
needs to recognise that the incentives provided are likely to have a distorting impact 
on the Third Sector. Ultimately this means public sector contracts need not have a 
negative impact overall, but any benefits achieved by using the Third Sector for 
public service provision need to be balanced against other social goods and 
services, which are lost.  
Consistent with those fearing that adoption of more commercial business 
approaches may have a negative influence on achieving traditional Third Sector 
objectives (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2003; Weisbrod, 2004), a significant negative 
relationship is found between the use of earned income from trading and the 
probability of successfully achieving objectives. It appears that although providing 
the organisation with discretion over the use of any surplus, this is not enough to 
overcome the theorised resource drain and lack of alignment between activities and 
social objectives (Weisbrod, 1998b). The results consistency with a weak alignment 
between trading activities and social objectives provide evidence for those fearing 
that the type of goods and services provided will be as strongly influenced through 
hybridisation with the private sector (Dees, 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2003; 
Weisbrod, 2004). Many social enterprises are relatively grant dependent and income 
from trading activities is not necessarily a sustainable source of income (Senyard et 
al., 2007). Where financial support is provided in the form of grants or subsidies to 
social enterprises, it would be preferable to target those TSOs that are best able to 
show that trading activities form part of the mechanism to achieve their objectives. In 
other words where the trading activities form an end in themselves rather than just 
as a means to an end.  
The study has identified the relationships between different sources of funding 
and the perceived success of the Third Sector. The data, however, limits the detail 
that can be provided with regard to these relationships. Only the use of a source of 
funding and the main funding sources are identified, rather than the full breakdown of 
funding sources utilised. This means it is not possible to identify whether the 
particular combinations of funding have an impact on organisations’ success in 
achieving their objectives. Knowledge of such relationships would be valuable for 
policy makers looking to determine the correct mixture of incentives and support to 
achieve maximum social benefit. Similarly the outcomes are self-assessed, which 
may mean that bias is present. It is also possible that different organisations will 
interpret what constitutes their objectives differently. Objective evaluations of the 
Third Sectors’ impacts are difficult if not impossible to achieve in many cases, but 
future studies would perhaps be well advised to examine the influence of finance 
choice from the perspective of both the organisation and other stakeholders to avoid 
the limitations noted above.  
The study did control for legal form and main groups of users, but these 
controls are relatively crude and assume that the relationships with other 
organisational controls remain the same for subgroups of TSOs. As availability of 
funding and obstacles to successful achievement of objectives can vary 
considerably, future studies would be advised to consider comparisons of important 
subgroups of TSOs. Interfaces with government may differ considerably between 
sectors (Proulx et al., 2007), playing an important role in the outcomes achieved. 
Likewise, given the quite different nature of Third Sector and non-profit activities 
across countries, internationally comparative studies where public policy has 
followed similar agendas would be quite revealing. According to social origins theory 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1998), it might be expected that similar results will be found 
for those countries with similar historical influences driving the formation and liberal 
nature of the Third Sector in the UK, such as the US. Other countries may 
experience quite different relationships particularly where fees have traditionally 
played a more important role, such as ‘statist’ Japan, or where cooperation between 
the state and Third Sector is greater in ‘corporatist’ France or Germany. Although the 
results of this study were examined on the basis of the outcomes that theory 
suggested would be present, qualitative studies are needed to examine these 
mechanisms in more detail. Longitudinal studies would be of particular value where 
hybridisation takes place over a period of time, and pressures on the traditional 
values of the Third Sector may increase or be accommodated. 
This study does suggest that greater hybridisation of the Third Sector is likely 
to have detrimental effects on the success of the Third Sector in terms of its 
provision of unique goods and services, particularly when taking on private sector 
characteristics. From these results there is a need to consider not only what is 
gained in terms of saved resources, but also what is lost in terms of less tangible, but 
often equally valuable community assets, when putting policies in place which lead 
to changes in the nature of the Third Sector.  
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Appendix 1 – Non-charity legal forms 
Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLGs) and Community Interest Companies 
(CICs) are private limited companies and can borrow against their assets. CLGs can 
produce a surplus to fund activities, but this cannot be distributed. The CLG form 
protects trustees of organisations from liability where they are likely to enter into 
contracts relating to employment or property (BIS, 2011a). CIC is the legal form 
developed for social enterprises. CICs do not have to be established for charitable 
purposes, but any lawful purpose as long as they are run clearly for the benefit of a 
community. They may even pay dividends in some cases, but their primary objective 
should not be to create wealth for owners and assets cannot be transferred (BIS, 
2011a; Regulator of Community Interest Companies, 2010). Industrial and Provident 
Societies are run by and for the mutual benefit of their members rather than outside 
investors. Surpluses can be distributed to members, but are usual reinvested in the 
society (BIS, 2011a; 2011b). 
 
Appendix 2 – Identification of main groups of users served by organisations 
In order to control for the difficulties that might be faced when serving particular 
groups of the population, the main groups of users were identified. The organisations 
were asked to indicate up to three groups of users of their goods and services. There 
was a danger of correlation between user groups where separate groups suffering 
from similar issues were served by the same organisation. In order to overcome this 
problem principal components analysis was used to identify broader groups of 
clients. A maximum likelihood approach was adopted using the varimax orthogonal 
rotation to ensure that the components obtained were not correlated and ensuring 
easier interpretation of the individual components. The factor scores were estimated 
using the Anderson-Rubin approach that is suggested where non-correlated factor 
scores are required (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Four components (the general 
public, victims of crime or drug abuse, those suffering from mental or physical 
disability, members of minority groups in society) were identified using Kaiser’s 
(1960) criterion of eigenvalues of greater than 1. Cattell’s (1966) approach of 
examining the scree plot’s inflexion point confirms this in part, although a second 
inflexion point is found for seven factors. Bartlett’s sphericity test rejects the null of 
the covariance matrix taking the form of an identity matrix, indicating that there is 
some correlation between the separate user groups. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (MKO) 
measure of sampling adequacy indicating the extent that the patterns of correlation 
are relatively compact, so distinct separate factors are likely to be estimated exceeds 
the bare minimum of 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974) with a value of 0.59, but this is only in the 
range described as mediocre by Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I – Characteristics of funding sources 
 
 Public Sector Contracts 
Income from 
Trading 
Activities 
Sources 
Independence of 
use Low High 
IVAR (2006), Kelly, 
(2007) 
Average Alignment 
of objectives Medium Low 
Weisbrod (1998b), 
Billis (2010b), Harris, 
(2010) 
Presence of 
required skills and 
competencies 
Medium Low 
Ellis and Gregory 
(2008), McBrearty 
(2007) 
Lack of reliance on 
outside agencies for 
continuation 
Medium High 
Senyard et al. (2007), 
IVAR (2006), Kelly, 
(2007) 
Reliability of funding 
in the short/medium 
term 
Medium Low Jones (2010) 
Perceived 
sustainability of 
source 
Medium High Dart (2004) 
Lack of regulatory 
or governance 
burden 
Low High 
Ellis and Gregory 
(2008), Arvidson 
(2009) 
 
 
Table II – Satisfaction in achieving organisational objectives by funding sources 
 
Panel A - Use as a 
source of funding  
Not 
successful 
Fairly 
successful 
Very 
successful 
chi-
square 
p-
value 
Donations and 
fundraising activities 
Not used 9.1% 52.3% 38.6% 128.2 (0.000) Used 5.2% 51.9% 42.9% 
Membership fees 
and subscriptions 
Not used 6.4% 50.5% 43.0% 27.1 (0.000) Used 5.6% 53.8% 40.6% 
Grants from non-
statutory bodies 
Not used 7.2% 52.9% 39.9% 147.7 (0.000) Used 3.9% 50.2% 45.8% 
National lottery Not used 6.5% 52.5% 41.0% 77.1 (0.000) Used 3.6% 48.7% 47.7% 
Grants or core 
funding 
Not used 7.1% 53.4% 39.6% 247.8 (0.000) Used 3.0% 47.8% 49.2% 
Earned income from 
contracts 
Not used 6.5% 52.6% 40.9% 67.7 (0.000) Used 4.2% 49.4% 46.3% 
Earned trading 
income (inc. retail) 
Not used 6.2% 51.5% 42.4% 9.8 (0.007) Used 5.8% 53.9% 40.3% 
Income from 
investments 
Not used 6.9% 52.6% 40.5% 108.5 (0.000) Used 3.9% 50.3% 45.8% 
  
     Panel B - Main source of funding Not successful 
Fairly 
successful 
Very 
successful 
chi-
square 
p-
value 
Donations and fundraising 
activities 6.4% 54.6% 39.0% 35.7 (0.000) 
Membership fees and 
subscriptions 5.1% 55.3% 39.6% 28.1 (0.000) 
Grants from non-statutory 
bodies 6.2% 50.0% 43.8% 3.4 (0.184) 
National lottery 7.4% 51.7% 40.9% 2.3 (0.310) 
Grants or core funding 3.5% 47.0% 49.5% 117.2 (0.000) 
Earned income from contracts 5.1% 50.6% 44.3% 7.0 (0.030) 
Earned income from trading 
including retail 8.2% 54.6% 37.1% 30.6 (0.000) 
Income from investments 5.8% 53.3% 40.9% 0.7 (0.695) 
All 6.1% 52.0% 41.9%   
 
 
Table III – Multinominal logits of extent the organisation has been successful in 
meeting its objectives over the past 12 months 
 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 
 Not Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Sources of Finance     
Donations and fundraising activities  
(N = 18,435)  
  0.8227 1.0247 
  (0.005) (0.503) 
Membership fees and subscriptions 
(N = 10,714) 
  0.8436 0.9241 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Grants from non-statutory bodies 
(N = 8280) 
  0.7909 1.0694 
  (0.001) (0.036) 
National lottery 
(N = 3353) 
  0.8450 1.1101 
  (0.113) (0.013) 
Grants or core funding 
(N = 5911) 
  0.7812 1.1508 
  (0.008) (0.000) 
Earned income from contracts 
(N = 4705) 
  0.8389 1.0434 
  (0.053) (0.274) 
Earned income from trading including 
retail (N = 5158) 
  1.0472 0.8481 
  (0.547) (0.000) 
Income from investments 
(N = 6485) 
  0.7502 1.0950 
  (0.000) (0.004) 
 
Organisation Level Controls     
Main Groups of Users     
General Population 1.0069 0.9932 1.0046 1.0027 
 (0.805) (0.623) (0.869) (0.846) 
Victims or involved in crime or drugs 1.0071 0.9987 1.0074 0.9917 
 (0.762) (0.919) (0.750) (0.512) 
Physically or mentally disabled 0.9777 1.0578 0.9916 1.0480 
 (0.440) (0.000) (0.774) (0.000) 
Minority groups 1.0964 0.9048 1.0932 0.9010 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legal Form (b.c. Charity N = 19,796)     
Community Interest Company 
(N = 182) 
1.6999 0.8092 1.5015 0.8418 
(0.033) (0.201) (0.107) (0.302) 
Company Ltd by Guarantee 
(N = 2883) 
1.5344 0.7861 1.4005 0.8266 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industrial and Provincial Societies 
(N = 1273) 
2.4025 0.5554 2.0975 0.6234 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: odds ratios represent the probabilities of achieving the relevant outcome 
relative to the base outcome of ‘fairly satisfied’; p-values in parentheses; 
emboldened figures significant at the 5 per cent level 
 
 
Table III - Continued 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 
 Not Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Organisation Level Controls - continued     
Geographical scope of operations  
(b.c. local operations N = 18,484)     
International Operations 
(N = 699) 
1.8564 0.8160 1.7376 0.8436 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.048) 
National Operations 
(N = 1713) 
1.3543 0.8025 1.3352 0.8308 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) 
Regional Operations 
(N = 3238) 
1.1770 0.9374 1.1969 0.9467 
(0.048) (0.118) (0.031) (0.188) 
Employment  
(b.c. 1 to 10 Employees N = 8542)     
No Employees 
(N = 12,611) 
1.3634 1.0067 1.3448 1.0053 
(0.001) (0.890) (0.002) (0.914) 
11 to 30 Employees 
(N = 1706) 
1.9867 0.7599 1.7931 0.8038 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
31 or more Employees 
(N = 1275) 
0.6569 1.2820 0.7099 1.2347 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) 
Volunteers  
(b.c. 1 to 10 volunteers N = 9515)     
No Volunteers 
(N = 830) 
1.2345 1.1091 1.1180 1.1315 
(0.116) (0.192) (0.413) (0.123) 
11 to 20 Volunteers 
(N = 7018) 
0.5499 1.0817 0.5915 1.0813 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.021) 
21 or more Volunteers 
(N = 6771) 
0.4388 1.1924 0.4881 1.1877 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Satisfaction with influence of local 
decision makers (b.c. neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied N = 8289)     
Very satisfied with local influence 
(N = 655) 
0.9553 3.4771 0.9034 3.4223 
(0.865) (0.000) (0.707) (0.000) 
Fairly satisfied with local influence 
(N = 5074) 
0.8602 1.3134 0.8607 1.2958 
(0.126) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) 
Fairly dissatisfied with local influence 
(N = 6177) 
1.6112 0.8914 1.6347 0.8864 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Very dissatisfied with local influence 
(N = 3939) 
2.7905 0.9990 2.7260 1.0141 
(0.000) (0.981) (0.000) (0.740) 
Notes: odds ratios represent the probabilities of achieving the relevant outcome 
relative to the base outcome of ‘fairly satisfied’; p-values in parentheses; 
emboldened figures significant at the 5 per cent level 
 
 
 
 
Table III - Continued 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 
 Not Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Area Level Controls     
Engagement with Volunteer Groups 0.9892 1.0059 0.9909 1.0056 (0.170) (0.117) (0.250) (0.137) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation of area 
(b.c. 5 to 10 N = 4695)     
IMD 0.1 to 5  
(N = 4695) 
1.0016 1.1233 0.9985 1.1253 
(0.991) (0.039) (0.991) (0.037) 
IMD 10 to 15 
(N = 4407) 
1.0084 0.9921 0.9959 0.9868 
(0.935) (0.857) (0.968) (0.762) 
IMD 15 to 25 
(N = 5385) 
1.2229 0.9265 1.2051 0.9153 
(0.030) (0.071) (0.045) (0.037) 
IMD 25 to 50 
(N = 5601) 
1.2660 0.8219 1.2608 0.7958 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
IMD 50 to 65 
(N = 1546) 
1.6456 0.8185 1.6688 0.7771 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMD 65 or more 
(N = 563) 
1.4742 1.0044 1.4697 0.9552 
(0.047) (0.964) (0.050) (0.639) 
Population density  
(b.c. 21 to 40 people N = 4925)     
Less than 4 people per hectare 
(N = 4679) 
1.0203 1.0255 1.0049 1.0261 
(0.840) (0.570) (0.961) (0.563) 
4 to 20 people per hectare 
(N = 6183) 
1.0299 1.0546 1.0367 1.0495 
(0.743) (0.186) (0.689) (0.231) 
41 to 70 people per hectare 
(N = 4753) 
1.1344 0.9984 1.1307 1.0019 
(0.165) (0.971) (0.177) (0.965) 
More than 71 people per hectare 
(N = 3594) 
1.0203 1.0255 1.0049 1.0261 
(0.840) (0.570) (0.961) (0.563) 
     
N 
 
24134 24134 
    
Likelihood Ratio Test against constant 
probability 1990.4 [62] (0.000) 2152.6 [78] (0.000) 
   
R2 0.047 0.051 
     
AIC 40371.7 40241.5 
   
Likelihood Ratio Test collective 
significance of finance variables  162.2 [16] (0.000) 
Notes: odds ratios represent the probabilities of achieving the relevant outcome 
relative to the base outcome of ‘fairly satisfied’; p-values in parentheses; 
emboldened figures significant at the 5 per cent level
Table IV – Multinominal logit of extent the organisation has been successful in meeting its objectives over the past 12 months 
influence of main sources of finance 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a 
 Not Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Membership fees and subscriptions 
(N = 4455) 
    0.6668 0.9437 
    (0.000) (0.122) 
Grants from non-statutory bodies 
(N = 1885) 
    0.9658 1.1272 
    (0.747) (0.021) 
National lottery 
(N = 729) 
    0.9841 1.0232 
    (0.918) (0.777) 
Grants or core funding 
(N = 3403) 
    0.8056 1.1766 
    (0.046) (0.000) 
Earned income from contracts 
(N = 1942) 
0.8391 1.0151   0.7913 1.0345 
(0.136) (0.774)   (0.050) (0.524) 
Earned income from trading 
including retail (N = 1940) 
  1.2269 0.8857 1.1013 0.9054 
  (0.039) (0.022) (0.346) (0.066) 
Income from investments 
(N = 934) 
    0.8323 0.9628 
    (0.224) (0.597) 
N 24134 24134 24134 
Likelihood Ratio Test against 
constant probability 1993.0 [64] (0.0000) 2001.9 [64] (0.000) 2056.9 [76] (0.000) 
R2 0.047 0.047 0.0487 
AIC 40373.1 40364.2 40333.2 
Likelihood Ratio Test against joint 
insignificance of finance sources 2.62 [2] (0.270) 11.53 [2] (0.003) 66.47 [14] (0.000) 
Notes: odds ratios represent the probabilities of achieving the relevant outcome relative to the base outcome of ‘fairly satisfied’; p-
values in parentheses; emboldened figures significant at the 5 per cent level; (a) where multiple main sources of funding enter these 
are compared to ‘donations and fund raising’ N = 7122 
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Table V – Multinominal logits of extent the organisation is confident that it will be able to meet its objectives over the next 12 
months, influence of sources of finance and main sources of finance 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Not Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Not 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Donations and fundraising activities 0.9066 0.8621       (0.065) (0.000)       
Membership fees and subscriptions 0.9772 0.9374     0.8334 1.0514 (0.607) (0.046)     (0.002) (0.223) 
Grants from non-statutory bodies 1.0123 0.8682     1.0008 0.7408 (0.805) (0.000)     (0.992) (0.000) 
National lottery 1.1033 1.0280     1.3606 0.9452 (0.127) (0.565)     (0.004) (0.551) 
Grants or core funding 1.0261 0.8948     1.1643 0.8627 (0.656) (0.008)     (0.020) (0.003) 
Earned income from contracts 0.9998 0.9251 1.0959 0.9480   1.1144 0.9128 (0.997) (0.078) (0.235) (0.369)   (0.167) (0.134) 
Earned income from trading including 
retail 
1.1124 0.8078   1.2140 0.8901 1.2196 0.8641 
(0.046) (0.000)   (0.008) (0.056) (0.008) (0.019) 
Income from investments 0.7759 1.1244     0.8186 1.2509 (0.000) (0.001)     (0.099) (0.003) 
N 24134 24134 24134 24134 
Likelihood Ratio Test against constant 
probability 2134.0 [64] (0.000) 1990.3 [64] (0.000) 2000.8 [64] (0.000) 2088.7 [76] (0.000) 
R2 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.048 
AIC 41963.8 42079.5 42069.0 42005.1 
Likelihood Ratio Test joint insignificance 
of finance sources 146.4 [16] (0.000) 2.7 [2] (0.254) 13.3 [2] (0.001) 101.1 [14] (0.000) 
Notes: odds ratios represent the probabilities of achieving the relevant outcome relative to the base outcome of ‘quite successful; p-values in 
parentheses; degrees of freedom in squared brackets; emboldened figures significant at the 5 per cent level; Model 5 funding sources refer to 
use of these sources; Models 6 to 8 funding sources refer to use only as the main source of finance.
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Figure 1 – Influences on desirability of funding sources 
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